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CAN FLORIDA’S LEGISLATIVE STANDARD OF REVIEW FOR 
SMALL-SCALE LAND USE AMENDMENTS BE JUSTIFIED?
BERNARD R. APPLEMAN
ABSTRACT
This article examines the legal justification and practical application of recent Florida 
Supreme Court decisions classifying all comprehensive plan amendments as legislative decisions 
and all other zoning changes as quasi-judicial.  The author outlines historical trends and concerns 
relating to the appropriate standard of judicial review for zoning actions, followed by a review of
the evolution of the statutes and case law in Florida. The article challenges the standard of 
deference for legislative review of zoning actions based on separation of powers and due 
process. It also identifies inconsistencies in Florida case law and inequities in local government 
processes for reviewing small-scale amendments and rezonings. The article concludes that 
classifying all amendments as legislative is not adequately reasoned or justified and leads to 
inconsistent and inequitable results. In addition, it provides recommendations for legislative 
reform.
2Contents
I.  INTRODUCTION ……………………………………………………………………..4
II. BACKGROUND ………………………………………………………………………5
A. Zoning and Comprehensive Planning …………………………………………….. 5
B. Standards for Judicial Review o f Zoning Decisions ……………………………... 6
1. Classifying Zoning Decisions Based on Effect on Policy …………………………..6
2. Decisions and Commentaries on Classifying Zoning Decisions ……………………6
      3. Procedure for Challenging Zoning Decisions ……………………………………….8
C. Zoning Practices and Abuses ………………………………...……………………. 8
1. Examples of Abuses and Deficiencies ………………………………………………9
2.  Comment from Courts on Abuse……………………………………………………10
3.  Commentaries on Alternative Standards of Review ………………………………..11
III. FLORIDA LAW FOR PLAN AMENDMENTS AND REZONINGS ….…………12
A.  Administrative Procedures for Amendments and Rezonings ……………………12
      1. Amending a Comprehensive Plan …………………………………………………...12
      2. Special Requirements for Small Scale Amendments ………………………………..13
Table 1: Differences Between Standard and Small-Scale Amendments  ……………14
      3. Comparing Small-Scale Amendments and Rezoning ………………………………..14
B. Florida Supreme Court Decisions Affecting Standards of Review for 
        Rezonings and for Plan Amendments ……………………… ………………………16
      1. Snyder Functional Analysis Test for Classifying Zoning Decisions …………………17
      2. Yusem Holds that Comprehensive Plan Amendments are Legislative Decisions ……18
      3. Courts’ Applications of Snyder and Yusem …………………………………………..19
      4. Coastal Extends Bright-Line Rule to Small-Scale Amendments …………………………… 20
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE LEGISLATIVE STANDARD OF REVIEW FOR 
SMALL-SCALE AMENDMENTS ………………………………………………………..21
A. Challenging the Legislative Standard of Review for Zoning Actions …………… ..21
      1. Local Governments do not Provide True Separation of Powers ……………………...21
32. Legislative Decisions Lack Due Process………………………………………………23
      3. Balancing the Efficiency of the Legislative Review Standard Against the Potential 
         for Abuse …………………………………………………………………………….....26
   B. Inequity and Lack of Consistency in Classifying  Small-Scale Amendments as 
Legislative Decisions ………………...………………………………………………………28
1. Small-Scale Amendments, Unlike Standard Amendments, Are Not Policy 
          Requiring the Fairly Debatable Standard………………………………… …………...28
2. The Adoption Processes for Small-Scale Amendments and Rezonings are Similar, 
but their Classifications Differ ………………………………………………………...29
3. Classifying all Rezoning as Quasi-Judicial is Inconsistent with Snyder’s 
            Functional Analysis.......................................................................................................30
         Table 2. Classification of Zoning Decisions from Florida Supreme Court Opinions .....33
4. The Yusem-Coastal Rule is not Consistent with the Statutory Differences
         Between Small and Large Scale Amendments …………………………………….......33
V. CONCLUSIONS ………………………………………………………………………….34
A. Small-Scale Amendments Are Not Policy ……….........................................................35
B. Land Use Action Classifications are Inconsistent and Conflicting………………......36
   C. Lack of Procedural Due Process Is a Concern for Local Land Use Decisions …...... 37
D. The Court’s Reasons for the Fairly Debatable Standard are Not Convincing ……..38
E. Recommendations for Legislative Reform …………………………………………….38
ENDNOTES …………………………………………………………………………………..40
4CAN FLORIDA’S LEGISLATIVE STANDARD OF REVIEW FOR SMALL-SCALE 
LAND USE AMENDMENTS BE JUSTIFIED?
I. INTRODUCTION
To rezone a 1.3 acre plot from residential low-density to commercial community-general, 
the City of Jacksonville exercised a state-mandated two stage process that entailed reviewing
policy implications and submitting a copy of the proposed change to a state agency.1  On the 
other hand, a zoning ordinance to add up to 600 multi-family residential units in an 885-acre 
tract did not require any policy analysis or submission to the state, but rather was subject to a 
review only of the impact of the change on the local comprehensive plan. 2  These apparently 
inconsistent processes result from the application of recent Florida Supreme Court decisions that 
apply a “bright-line“ rule classifying all comprehensive plan amendments as legislative decisions
subject to a highly deferential judicial review and all other zoning changes as quasi-judicial
decisions subject to a more stringent judicial review.3
This article examines whether this “bright line” rule is appropriate based on its legal 
justification and practical application. Part II outlines historical trends and concerns relating to 
the classification and the standard of judicial review for zoning actions. Part III reviews the 
evolution of the statutes and case law in Florida, including examples of the impact of the court’s
decisions. Part IV challenges the high deference of review afforded legislative zoning actions 
and identifies inconsistencies and inequities in the Florida process for reviewing amendments 
and rezonings. Finally, Part V summarizes the author’s rationale for concluding that designating 
all amendments as legislative is not justified and has resulted in the lack of a uniform, rational 
means for classifying land use decisions. In addition, it provides recommendations for legislative 
reform.
5II. BACKGROUND
A. Zoning and Comprehensive Planning
In the landmark 1926 case of Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., the Supreme Court 
validated local government zoning and planning as means to exercise state police power.4 The 
Standard State Zoning Enabling Act (SZEA) provided guidelines to the states in adopting, 
amending and enforcing zoning statutes.5 The SZEA stipulates that zoning regulations are to be 
established in accordance with a comprehensive plan.6 A comprehensive plan is a document 
prepared by a local government to serve as the basis for future decisions on zoning. It is future 
oriented, intended to anticipate and account for growth and change.7
Because of the extreme difficulty in accurately predicting future growth needs and 
because of a plan’s inherent transitory nature, there is an ongoing need to amend the provisions 
of a comprehensive plan.  Florida statutes, for example, mandate a revised plan every five years 
and provide procedures for regular and special amendments.8  The classification of amendments
and the ultimate procedure for adopting and challenging them is a major theme  of this article.9
An amendment to the comprehensive plan may be initiated by persons seeking a use not 
allowed by the plan or to eliminate a use that is permitted under the plan. The amended plan by 
itself typically does not permit a landowner a different use of his land. Rather, it changes the map 
that designates future land use (future land use map or FLUM).10 The landowner must then file 
for a zoning ordinance that achieves the desired zoning change.11
6B. Standards for Judicial Review of Zoning Decisions
1. Classifying Zoning Decisions Based on Effect on Policy
One can categorize local government decisions affecting land use based on how they 
relate to policy. Some decisions, such as adoption of a comprehensive land use plan or a major 
revision of the plan, are clearly policy-making acts. Decisions that formulate policy are 
classified as legislative actions based on the general function of that branch of government to 
establish broad goals and directions for the general welfare of the community.12 Other decisions,
such as granting a special use permit to a landowner who meets the specified requirements, are 
characterized as the application of a previously determined policy to a new parcel of land.13
Decisions that apply or interpret policies set by legislators are classified as judicial or quasi-
judicial actions.14   In between these two examples of land use changes, which are clearly either
policy making or policy application, lies a middle ground where it is not always evident whether 
the decision-making body is formulating or applying policy. 15 Examples are major rezonings 
within a designated land use and small-scale amendments to a comprehensive plan.16 How a
zoning decision is classified or labeled can profoundly influence the process for the decision and 
the outcome of a challenge to that decision.17
2. Decisions and Commentaries on Classifying Zoning Decisions
a) Euclid “Fairly Debatable” Standard to Classify Zoning Decisions
In the early stages of zoning, the Supreme Court established that zoning actions were 
legislative and that the decisions of a local government would not be overturned unless they were 
"clearly arbitrary and unreasonable, having no substantial relation to the public health, safety, 
morals, or general welfare."18 This standard is highly deferential to the legislature and became 
known as the “fairly debatable” standard.19 Through the 1960’s, almost all courts followed this 
rule for classifying zoning decisions.20
7b) Fasano v. Board of County Comm'rs of Washington County21
The Oregon Supreme Court was among the first courts to question the Euclid rationale.
In Fasano, several homeowners opposed a developer’s requested change of zoning from single 
family residential to planned residential, which allowed for a mobile home park. 22 The county
board of commissioners approved the developer’s request, overriding the vote of the planning 
commission, based on a finding that the increased density and different type of housing would 
help to meet the needs of urbanization.23 In denying the homeowners’ challenge, the county had 
argued that the board’s decision was legislative and that the homeowners would need to show 
that the county had acted arbitrarily (i.e., it sought to apply the fairly debatable standard). 24
In affirming the lower courts’ decision in favor of the homeowners, the Oregon Supreme 
Court noted that “a determination whether the permissible use of a specific piece of property 
should be changed is usually an exercise of judicial authority…”25 The court firmly rejected the 
notion that the judicial review of the zoning action was limited to whether the change was 
arbitrary and capricious.26
c) Other State Court Opinions
In explaining its holding, the Fasano court identified examples of other state supreme 
courts that had disputed the notion that all zoning decisions were legislative.27  The Washington 
Supreme Court explained that, in its role as a fact finding tribunal, the local planning 
commission more closely resembles a quasi-judicial proceeding than a legislative one.28
Supporting this trend, the Colorado Supreme Court in Snyder v. Lakewood distinguished between 
a judicial process that enacts a rezoning ordinance and a legislative process that enacts the 
general ordinance.29 In a subsequent decision, however, the Colorado Supreme Court partially 
overruled Lakewood, declaring that an amendment to a zoning ordinance is a legislative act.30
Some states rejected the trend initiated by Fasano and retained the Euclid fairly debatable 
standard.31 The California Supreme Court declared unequivocally that “zoning ordinances, 
whatever the size of parcel affected, are legislative acts.”32 The court in Arnel Dev. Co. v. Costa 
8Mesa further explained that classifying smaller zoning ordinance as quasi-judicial would unsettle 
well established rules, would create confusion resulting in time-consuming litigation, and would
not be necessary.33
d) Florida Decisions 
As of 1989, according to one commentator, about ten states had adopted the Fasano
quasi-judicial standard.34 In 1993, Florida joined this select group with the holding in Board of 
County Comm'rs v. Snyder that certain rezoning actions were quasi-judicial.35  Florida had 
adopted the Euclid standard in City of Miami Beach v. Ocean & Inland Co.,36 but Florida courts 
had experienced a great deal of controversy regarding the appropriate standard of review.37
3. Procedures for Challenging Zoning Decisions
a) Challenging Legislative Decisions
The SZEA provides procedures for reviewing quasi-judicial actions (i.e., decisions by 
boards of adjustors), but does not provide comparable procedures for reviewing legislative 
actions.38 Because most state statutes also do not prescribe procedures for reviewing legislative 
decisions on zoning, the courts will only permit a de novo appeal.39  Under a de novo appeal, an
appellant can seek declaratory judgment and injunctive relief.40 In reviewing the decision, the 
court applies the highly deferential “fairly debatable” standard.41
For a de novo review of a zoning decision, there is a rebuttable presumption that the 
ordinance is valid; the challenger must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the 
ordinance is “arbitrary and capricious.”42 The procedure entails first reviewing the property 
owner’s evidence to determine if he has been able to overcome the presumption of validity.43
The court then reviews the local government evidence to determine if it presents a “fairly 
debatable” response to the landowner claims.44
b) Challenging Quasi-Judicial Decisions
9For a quasi-judicial or administrative decision, the court is less deferential in its scope of 
review. The standards and procedures for this review are often prescribed by state administrative 
procedure acts,45 as well as by the SZEA.46 The party challenging the decision files a writ of 
certiorari.47 Under state administrative acts, quasi-judicial zoning decisions are presumed valid 
and afforded some deference based on the expertise of the board of adjustors, but not as much 
deference as for legislative decisions.48
Most state statutes require substantial evidence to support a quasi-judicial or
administrative action.49 The Fifth Circuit of the United States Court of Appeals (Fifth Circuit) 
noted that quasi-judicial decision s are reviewed to determine whether they are substantiated by 
the record.50 The same court further noted that legislative zoning decision are reviewed to 
determine if the government could reasonably conceive the  determinative facts as true.51 The 
Seventh Circuit observed that “[L]egislatures can base their action on considerations-such as the 
desire of a special interest group… that would be thought improper in judicial decision-
making.”52 In Florida, the appropriate standard of review for quasi-judicial decisions is 
competent substantial evidence.53 The requirement of competent substantial evidence is more 
stringent (i.e., more difficult for a local government to conform to) than the fairly debatable 
criterion and is often referred to as “strict scrutiny.” One should not, however, confuse this level 
of scrutiny with the strict scrutiny applied to equal protection and other constitutional tests.54
C. Zoning Practices and Abuses
1. Examples of Abuses and Deficiencies
Major factors in the need for legislation and alternative judicial treatment of land use 
decision have been actual and potential abuses in the decision-making process .55 Richard 
Babcock’s 1966 book on zoning provided the first comprehensive review of zoning practice in 
the United States.56 The book outlined general deficiencies of zoning due to: the lack of 
10
administrative procedures; the lack of ethics of politicians and developers; the bias in local 
decision-making: and the dearth of overall planning.57
In an update of the 1966 book, Babcock and Simon observed many of the same problems 
documented in the original.58 In spite of new zoning and increased use of planning, certain 
factors such as localism, greed and xenophobia were still present.59 The authors documented
cases in San Antonio, Chicago, and Lafayette, Louisiana, in which decisions by local legislative 
bodies were decided largely on political considerations.60 In Chicago, for example, the mayor 
and the city evaded for fifteen years a judge’s order to build public housing in white areas after a 
finding that the city had segregated blacks into one all-black area.61 The authors maintain that 
“the process of land use control remains unfair,” as it has been for fifty years.62 Parochial 
interests, e.g., the NIMBY63 attitude, have resulted in manipulation of the system by those with 
the power to do so.64 The authors contend that the main question is “whether the judiciary is 
qualified to deal effectively with these issues.”65
In an overview of zoning, law professor Robert Wright observed that the widespread 
abuse of the process of rezoning has encouraged courts to rethink the traditional approach for 
classifying zoning decision.66 He noted that zoning is an ad hoc process which is more 
administrative or quasi judicial than legislative and that a rezoning ordinance is often not the 
result of a comprehensive plan.67 He further observed that developers and other real estate 
interests, who frequently predominate on planning commissions, have a very strong influence on 
the decisions.68 As a result, a commission may approve a project over the opposition of the 
professional staff.69 He suggested that courts have recognized that the process is essentially an 
administrative, often politically tainted, process and questioned whether it is legislative.70
2.  Comment from Courts on Abuse
Judge Grimes in Snyder claimed that local zoning rules are very inconsistent, implying
that the fairly debatable rule was a factor.71 He also cited criticism by Babcock (deploring the
effect of “neighborhoodism and rank political influence on zoning “)72 and by Mandelker and
Tarlock (that zoning decision are too often ad hoc and self serving…).73 The Fasano court 
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asserted that quasi-judicial review for rezoning is justified because of the almost irresistible 
pressures that can be asserted by private economic interests on local governments.74 Both Fasano
and Snyder changed the standard of review of certain zoning actions from legislative to quasi-
judicial in efforts to reduce the abuses and conflicts of interest.75
3. Commentaries on Alternative Standards of Review 
This divergence of opinion on how to classify land use decisions led to a plethora of legal 
analysis and commentary. An editor of The Urban Lawyer applauded the Fasano court for 
providing a logical basis for judicial review of rezoning decision.76  He enthusiastically agreed 
that the benefit of judicial review in controlling development and in preserving use for its desired 
purposes greatly outweighed any disadvantages.77 A city attorney from Austin, Texas 
recommended that his state follow the Oregon approach.78 He warned that the inadequacy of 
standards of review for rezoning cases increased the likelihood that zoning decisions would be 
based on the extent of lobbying instead of the merits of the case.79
An Illinois law professor agreed that courts should use a functional analysis (similar to 
that described in Fasano) for small rezonings because they more closely resemble judicial acts 
than legislative acts.80 Their primary impact falls on only a few landowners.81 He asserted that 
many courts fail to provide due process protection to legislative decisions.82  As a result, he 
maintained, several states adopted the Fasano approach primarily because it provides due 
process safeguards.83
A California commentator argued that her state’s insistence on the fairly debatable rule 
for all zoning actions was unfair to small landowners.84 She advocated increased statutory 
protection by requiring legislative decisions to be supported by findings, by increasing the 
number of hearings and dissemination, and by allowing victims of arbitrary or discriminatory 
land use decision to recover attorney fees for successful challenges.85 In his comprehensive 
review of Snyder, Thomas Pelham, a prominent Florida land use attorney strongly opposed the 
quasi-judicial standard for amendments to a comprehensive plan.86 Overall, however, the 
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commentators strongly supported the principle of classifying at least some rezoning actions as 
quasi-judicial rather than legislative. 
III. FLORIDA LAW FOR PLAN AMENDMENTS AND REZONINGS
A.  Administrative Procedures for Amendments and Rezonings
1. Amending a Comprehensive Plan 
a) Requirements for Comprehensive Plans
Consistent with the SZEA, the Florida legislature enacted Growth Management Acts in 
1975 and 198587   requiring local governments to adopt local comprehensive plans consistent 
with the Act.88  The local plans must establish “principles, guidelines and standards for the 
orderly and balanced future economic, social, physical, environmental and fiscal development of 
the area.”89 The plans must include specified elements, including a future land use element 
(FLUE).90 The FLUE must contain a future land use map (FLUM), which designates the 
permissible land use classifications (e.g., commercial, residential, conservation, industrial, and 
agricultural) for all the various plots and parcels. 
b) Proposal- First Stage Review
The process to develop or amend a comprehensive plan involves two stages, a proposal 
stage and an adoption stage.91 Based on its own initiative or from a constituent, the designated 
local planning agency (LPA) of the local government prepares a draft amendment to the 
comprehensive plan.92 Following a public hearing by the local government,93 the LPA submits 
the draft for review to the Florida Department of Community Affairs (DCA), the state-wide 
agency that oversees land planning.94 The draft is also sent to the appropriate regional planning 
council, as well as to the regional water management district, state Departments of 
Transportation and Environmental Protection, and other public agencies.95 The DCA has 
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discretion on whether to review, but must conduct the review if requested to do so by a regional 
planning council, an affected person, or the local government that submitted the amendment.96
c) Adoption- Second Stage Review
The procedure for adoption depends on whether the DCA reviews the proposed 
amendment. If the DCA reviews the amendment, it issues an ORC (Objections, 
Recommendations and Comments) report.97  Following a second public hearing, the local 
government has sixty days to adopt the amendment as originally drafted, to adopt the amendment 
with change, or to decide not to adopt the amendment. 98  If the DCA has not reviewed the 
amendment, and there are no proposed changes or objections from any affected party, the 
amendment can be adopted directly.99 After the local government adopts the amendment, it 
resubmits the amendment to DCA and the Regional Planning Commission for review. 100 The 
Florida statute does not give DCA or the governor authority to adopt, repeal or revise the 
amendment.101 The teeth is the authority to levy sanctions, mostly economic (e.g., withhold
funds for roads or water systems) if the plan or amendment is out of compliance.102
2.  Special Requirements for Small-Scale Amendments
In 1995 the Florida legislature exempted small scale amendments from several of the 
requirements described above.103 The act defined a small-scale amendment as follows:104
• It involves land use of ten acres or less.  
• It does not involve a text change to the goals, policies or objectives of the comprehensive 
plan. A land use change to the FLUM is considered a small-scale amendment.
In the proposal phase,105 the small-scale amendment requires only one hearing compared 
to two hearings for a general amendment.106  Similar to the procedure for a standard plan 
amendment, the local government submits the proposed amendment to the DCA and other
government or public agencies.107  The DCA, however, has indicated that it does not review 
small scale proposals.108 Furthermore, in the adoption stage, the local government is not required 
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to submit the amendment to the DCA as is required for a standard amendment.109 Municipalities 
and counties are permitted to adopt small-scale amendments immediately upon conclusion of the 
adoption hearing.110 Table 1 summarizes the differences between processes for standard and 
small-scale amendments.
Table 1: Differences Between Standard and Small-Scale Amendments 
Action Standard  Amendment Small-Scale Amendment
General Provisions; § 163.3187(1)(c)1
Area involved More than ten acres Ten acres or less
Plan Content Any content change No change in FLUM or text
Frequency of amendment Twice a year maximum Any time*
First Stage- Proposal
§ 163.3184(15) § 163.3187(1)(c)
Public Hearings Two required One required
Submission for review Sent  to DCA & other agencies Sent  to DCA & other agencies
DCA review Discretionary; Review if request by 
local government or affected party ;
DCA  does not review 
Second Stage- Adoption
Statute § 163.3184(7)(a) § 163.3184(7)(a)
Public Hearings One public hearing One public hearing
Adoption options by local 
government 
• Adopt with changes;
• Adopt without changes; or 
• Not adopt
• Adopt with changes;
• Adopt without changes; or
•  Not adopt
Submittal to DCA Sent  to DCA & other agencies Not required unless challenged
  * Small-scale amendments are limited on cumulative acreage per year.
3. Comparing Small-Scale Amendments and Rezonings
Not only are small-scale amendments treated differently than standard (large scale) 
amendments, but in many localities, the processing of small-scale amendments is similar to that 
of rezonings not involving an amendment. The example below compares a municipality’s 
process for a rezoning with that for a small-scale amendment.
  The City of Jacksonville processed a request to allow commercial development on a 1.3 
acre plot for a property that had been residential.111 The new use required a change in the land 
use designation of the FLUM from LDR (low density residential) to CGC (community general 
commercial)112 and a change in the zoning district within the new land use designation from 
RDR (residential low density) to  CCG (commercial community general).113
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The city processed the two changes in tandem. A tandem process requires that the board 
of commissioners deliberate first on the amendment to the comprehensive plan to determine if 
the general type of development sought should be permitted.114 Once the amendment has been 
approved, the board considers the suitability of the proposed rezoning.115 The new land use 
sought by the City of Jacksonville thus required two separate ordinances to be reviewed in 
tandem. The first ordinance, which changed the land use designation map (the FLUM), was
considered a small-scale amendment to the city’s comprehensive plan.116 The second ordinance,
proposing a change from one permitted zoning class to another within a land use designation, 
was a rezoning, not entailing any change to the comprehensive plan.117 The specific procedures
that the city followed are summarized below. 
a) Procedural Steps for Small-Scale Amendment Ordinance 2004-5118
1. Ordinance is proposed by property owner, developer or member of city council.119
2. Following notice, the planning and development department held a public information 
workshop; considered comments; prepared a report; and rendered a favorable advisory 
opinion to city council.120
3. The planning commission (the local planning agency) held a public meeting after notice;
considered comments at the meeting; and recommended approval to city council.121
4. The land use and zoning committee held a public meeting after notice; considered 
comments; and recommended approval to city council.122
5. The city council held a public meeting after notice, considering public comments and 
recommendations of other committees.123
6. The city council determined the bill was necessary to achieve specified general goals of 
the comprehensive plan and adopted the ordinance based on its statutory authority.124
b) Procedural Steps for Rezoning Ordinance 2004-6125
1. Ordinance is initiated by a property owner, developer or member of city council.126
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2. The planning and  development department  considered the ordinance and rendered an
advisory opinion that it was consistent with the city’s 2010 comprehensive plan.127
3. The planning commission considered the ordinance and rendered a favorable advisory 
opinion.128
4. The Land Use and Zoning Committee, after notice, held a public hearing and made a
favorable recommendation to city council.129
5. The city council held a public meeting after notice and considered public comments 
along with recommendations of other committees.130
6. The city council determined  that the ordinance met the general requirements (similar to 
the purpose of a plan) and the objectives of the PUD section of the zoning code and 
adopted the zoning change.131
These procedures, though based on different statutory requirements, are nearly identical 
and do not support a claim of qualitatively different evaluation processes. Because the city 
defined the small-scale amendment as a legislative process and the rezoning as a quasi-judicial 
process, it utilized slightly different formalities in the review procedures. These are, however,
distinctions without any differences. The first five steps, consisting of initiation,  internal review,
public meetings, and hearings, were identical.  Step 6, the justifications for the need for the 
changes, differed slightly as they were keyed to the specific requirements for the two types of 
action. What is most significant is that the two actions, nominally so similar, will be treated 
substantially differently if challenged by an affected party.132
B. Florida Supreme Court Decisions Affecting Standards of Review for
Rezonings and for Plan Amendments
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The recent history of the development of the standard of review is dominated by three 
Florida Supreme Court decisions, which form the basis of the current law in Florida.
1. Snyder Functional Analysis Test for Classifying Zoning Decisions133
In 1993, the Florida Supreme Court established a functional analysis test that classified a 
zoning decision as legislative if it formulated land use policy and as quasi-judicial if it merely 
applied policy.134 The Snyders sought to rezone their property to a classification allowing up to 
fifteen units per acre.135 The county staff recommended denial of the rezoning application 
because the property was located in the one-hundred year flood plain in which only two units per 
acre were permitted.136 Based on the Snyders’ plan to raise the land elevation to eliminate the 
flood plain concern, the planning and zoning board voted to approve the requested zoning 
change.137  However, as a result of citizen opposition based on increased traffic, the commission 
ultimately denied the rezoning request without providing a reason.138
In affirming the lower court reversal, the Fifth District Court of Appeal explained that “ a 
rezoning action which entails the application of a general rule or policy to specific individuals,
interests or activities is quasi judicial in nature,” requiring a standard of review  stricter than the 
“fairly debatable” standard applied to legislative matters.139  Applying these principles to the 
Snyders’ circumstances, the state supreme court found that the petition for rezoning was 
consistent with the comprehensive plan and that the government had not sufficiently asserted the 
public need for a more restrictive zoning classification.140 Thus, there was no basis for the 
board’s denial of the rezoning.141
The court concluded that “[i]t is the character of the hearing that determines whether or 
not board action is legislative or quasi-judicial.” 142 The court adopted its explanation of the 
general distinction from a 1935 case.143
A judicial or quasi-judicial act determines the rules of law applicable, and the 
rights affected by them, in relation to past transactions. On the other hand, a 
quasi-legislative or administrative order prescribes what the rule or requirement of 
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administratively determined duty shall be with respect to transactions to be 
executed in the future, in order that same shall be considered lawful.144
It then applied that principle to land use decisions. “Rezoning actions which have an 
impact on a limited number of persons or property owners, on identifiable parties and interests, 
where the decision is contingent on a fact or facts ….. are quasi-judicial actions…”145 Based on 
this analysis, the court concluded that the Snyders’ rezoning application was “ in the nature of a 
quasi-judicial proceeding….”146
The court established the following process for reviewing a rezoning application:
1) A property owner has the initial burden of proof that rezoning is consistent with the 
comprehensive plan and rezoning procedures.147
2) The burden then shifts to the local government’s review  board to establish  that 
maintaining the existing classification  accomplishes a legitimate government purpose 
and that the denial is not “ arbitrary, discriminatory, or unreasonable.”  The board is not 
required to make findings of fact, but it must show that the ruling was supported by 
“competent substantial evidence.” 148
2. Yusem Holds that Comprehensive Plan Amendments are Legislative Decisions149
In 1997, the Court established the rule that an amendment to a local government’s
comprehensive plan is by definition formulation of policy and hence legislative in nature.150
Yusem, a landowner, sought to change the use of a fifty-four acre plot to estate density (two 
units per acre). 151  According to the FLUM of  Martin County’s revised comprehensive plan, 
Yusem’s plot was part of a 900-acre tract that was designated rural density (one residence per 
two acres).152 Yusem applied to the board of commissioners for an amendment to the future land 
use map.153 The board submitted the proposed amendment to the Florida DCA, which 
recommended that the county deny the amendment or revise the analysis to justify a showing of 
consistency with the more intensive nearby land use.154 When the board decided to deny the 
proposal rather than revise it, Yusem filed for declaratory and injunctive relief.155 In a divided 
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opinion with a strong dissent from Judge (now Justice) Pariente,156 the Fourth District Court of 
Appeal, relying on Snyder, affirmed the circuit court decision to grant the motions. 157
After reviewing the detailed protocols for a plan amendment, the Florida Supreme Court 
concluded that amendments to a comprehensive plan are legislative decisions, even “in respect to 
only one piece of property.”158 The court’s decision limited the use of the functional analysis test
to strict rezonings.159 It distinguished plan amendments such as that of Yusem from rezonings, 
such as the one in Snyder.160  In a well-noted footnote, the court, recognizing that the 1995 
amendment to the statute provided special treatment for proposed small- scale amendments to the 
comprehensive plan, chose not to include those amendments in its holding, noting that “[w]e do 
not make any findings concerning the appropriate standard of review for these small scale 
developments.”161
The court explained that because a land use plan is “like a constitution for all future 
development…,” functional analysis is not appropriate for comprehensive plan amendments.162
Reviewing a proposed amendment requires a county to “engage in policy reformulation…’ and 
to decide if changes were warranted to promote “orderly development of the County’s future 
growth.”163 The county would also be required to evaluate the impact of the amendment on other 
county activities relating to future growth.164 The court noted that this decision involved 
considerations “well beyond the landowner’s fifty four acres.”165
The court further justified its conclusion that amendments are legislative decisions by 
outlining the multi- stage review process required under Florida law.166 Thus the court 
concluded, an amendment requires “strict oversight on the several levels of government,” in 
contrast to rezoning request, which is evaluated on the local level only.167
3. Courts’ Applications of Snyder and Yusem
Snyder, as a major departure from previous practice elicited significant criticism.168
Following Yusem, courts were divided on whether small-scale amendment were legislative or 
quasi-judicial.169 In Fleeman, the Fifth District Court of Appeal held that the request to change 
the land use of a 0.26-acre plot was a small-scale amendment to the comprehensive plan and 
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constituted a legislative act.170  The court added that this case was a good example of the need to 
define a small-scale amendment as a legislative policy decision.171 Even though it was a small 
parcel, its proximity to the ocean and to a major thoroughfare suggested important policy 
concerns.172 These concerns are “better left to the legislative body, with limited judicial 
review.”173
In Grondin, a circuit court held that a small-scale amendment was a quasi-judicial 
action.174 The court first established that the zoning change of a three-acre parcel from single 
family to commercial qualified as a small-scale amendment under the statutes, as the proposed 
change was consistent with the stated policies of comprehensive plan and would not result in a 
change in the text of the comprehensive plan. 175 According to the court, the proposed land use 
change was not the broad formulation of policy associated with a legislative decision; rather the 
city’s decision more closely resembled an application of the comprehensive plan.176  Finding that 
the city decision was not supported by competent substantial evidence, the court quashed the 
city’s denial of the amendment. 177
4. Coastal Extends Bright-Line Rule to Small-Scale Amendments178
In 2001, the Court confirmed that the Yusem bright-line rule for classifying 
comprehensive plan amendments as legislative also applied to small-scale amendments.179
Coastal Development of North Florida, Inc. (Coastal Development), seeking to change the 
FLUM designation of 1.7 acres of property from residential to commercial, submitted an 
application showing it met five of the six criteria for an amendment.180 At a hearing before the 
planning commission, where Coastal Development’s experts were opposed by citizens objecting 
to the traffic, the commission and the city council turned down the request as not consistent with 
the plan’s goals of first infilling existing commercial space.181
The dispute ultimately reached the Florida Supreme Court, which held that small-scale 
comprehensive plan amendments are legislative decisions subject to the fairly-debatable standard 
of review.182 While recognizing that the procedure for small-scale amendment is somewhat 
different from that of a standard amendment, the court maintained  that this proceeding still 
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allows the DCA to intervene and an affected person to challenge whether an adopted amendment 
complies with the statute.183
The court endorsed the statement by Pelham184 that even for a single tract of land, one 
must consider the entire comprehensive plan and not just the FLUM.185 The court explained that 
the FLUM, as part of the comprehensive plan, is itself a policy decision.186  Any change in the 
FLUM requires the local government to re-examine policy, even if the amendment to the FLUM 
is consistent with the textual goals and objectives of the comprehensive plan.187 The court 
distinguished a change in the FLUM (which formulates policy) with a change that is consistent 
with the FLUM (which applies policy).188  In addition,  no matter what the size of the 
amendment, the local government must determine whether the reformulation of policies is 
socially desirable.189 This determination will force the local government to consider the expected 
impact on other government services such as traffic and utilities.190 These considerations differ 
from the considerations involved in a rezoning. 191  Judge Wells concluded 1) that although 
small-scale amendments lack mandatory DCA oversight, alternate remedies are available to any 
aggrieved parties that are not available in standard rezoning actions; and 2) the decision 
reinforces the policy of uniformity and certainty in land use decisions.192
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE LEGISLATIVE STANDARD OF REVIEW FOR SMALL-
SCALE AMENDMENTS
The author’s challenges to the general validity of legislative re view of small-scale 
amendments are based on: lack of separation of powers for local decisions: the limited due 
process for legislative actions: and the enhanced potential for abuse with legislative processes. 
Florida specific challenges include: the lack of consistency among the key Florida Supreme 
Court cases; and inequities in processes for small-scale amendments, large scale amendments
and rezonings. 
A. Challenging the Legislative Standard of Review for Zoning Actions
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1. Local Governments do not Provide True Separation of Powers
The special nature of the lawmaking process as justification for great deference to 
legislative decisions may not be valid at the local level of government. The separation of powers 
into legislative, judicial and executive branches was a critical factor in the framing and 
acceptance of the Constitution.193  According to Madison, the chief obstacle to fairness in the 
legislature is conflict among factions where one interest group attempts to force its will on 
others. 194  But in a large and diverse group, no single faction would have enough influence to 
dominate the others.195 Rather, advocates achieve their ends by organizing coalitions and 
persuading their colleagues.196
Because this balancing prevents abuse, legislative actions are given greater deference 
than judicial or executive actions.197 However, this analysis is based on the separation of powers
as exhibited in the federal or state governments.198  For this model to operate according to the 
framers’ intent, the legislative bodies must be of a sufficient size to contain a “variety of interests 
that no one faction could tyrannize the others.”199 This is often not the case in city or county 
governments where domination by a single interest or faction is more likely to occur.200
As a result, local legislative bodies provide fewer safeguards than a larger representative 
body.201 One can argue that decisions by local lawmaking bodies are never fully legislative for 
the purposes of judicial review.202  In decisions regarding land use, local governments will not be 
restrained by the factors identified by Madison.203 Accordingly, the courts should defer less to 
local land use decisions compared to those of state or federal lawmakers.204
Thus, defining a small- scale amendment as policy does not make it legislative and 
deserving of deference.205 What gives legislature its legitimacy is the process of legislation.206
When this process loses its broad-based character and its distinction from an adjudicative body,
as typically occurs for local governments, the rationale for deference is also lost.
A second factor for questioning deference to local legislative decisions is that local 
governments often do not strictly follow the notions of separate and distinct roles for legislative, 
executive, and judicial officials. 207 Typically, especially in smaller localities, elected bodies 
perform duties that are administrative or quasi-judicial in nature as well as legislative.208 This 
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practice is particularly relevant to zoning decisions.209 By rezoning, city councils or county 
commissions make decisions that are quasi-judicial ( i.e., applying a law to a particular case).210
Commentators have asserted that the legislative/adjudicative split in zoning decisions
demonstrates the lack of validity in applyin g federal and state concepts to local government.211
The difference in applying separation of powers at the state and local levels is illustrated 
in a Georgia Supreme Court case.212 A landowner challenged the constitutionality of an 
ordinance for issuing bonds because the chief commissioner also served in the executive branch 
of the county.213 The state supreme court held that the separation of powers under the state 
constitution “has no relation to municipal offices, created by the legislature, in the discharge of 
strictly municipal functions."214 This court explicitly held that the constitutional phrase, "[T]he 
legislative, judicial, and executive powers shall forever remain separate and distinct; and no 
person discharging the duties of one shall at the same time exercise the functions of either of the 
others except as herein provided,” applied only to the state government and not to counties or 
municipalities.215 The court added that as the county commission serves as both the executive 
and legislative branches, the separation of powers could not apply to counties or to 
municipalities.216
2. Legislative Decisions Lack Due Process
Another criticism of the application of the legislative fairly debatable standard of review 
is that it denies procedural due process to those challenging the local government’s decision.217
The Court has observed that the role of procedural due process is to avoid erroneous results and 
deprivations.218 Procedural due process applies to administrative or adjudicative actions but not 
to legislative actions.219 Judge Posner asserted that "’[l]egislative due process’ seems almost an 
oxymoron.”220 In principle, due process is not required for legislative acts because the large 
number of constituents causes legislators to act reasonably.221
a) Elements of Due Process
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It is instructive to examine the specific elements of due process with respect to land use 
decisions. The fundamental meaning of the due process clause is that at a minimum it requires
that “deprivation of life, liberty or property by adjudication be preceded by notice and 
opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of the case.”222 Due process does not entail a 
fixed procedure; rather it varies with the circumstances.223  Justice Brandeis observed that due 
process assures:  “[T]hat the trier of the facts shall be an impartial tribunal; that no findings shall 
be made except upon due notice and opportunity to be heard; [and] that the procedure at the 
hearing shall be consistent with the essentials of a fair trial....”224 The Oregon Supreme Court 
summarized what the parties at a land use hearing are entitled to as follows:  an opportunity to be 
heard, an opportunity to present and rebut evidence,  a tribunal which is impartial in the matter 
(i.e., having had no pre-hearing or ex parte contacts concerning the question at issue),  a record to 
be  made, and adequate findings executed.225 A Florida judge explained that “the quality of due 
process required in a quasi-judicial hearing is not the same as that to which a party to the full 
judicial hearing is required and that quasi-judicial proceedings are not “controlled by strict rules 
of evidence and procedure.”226
b) Impartial Tribunal
A person with an interest in land that is affected by the zoning actions should be 
precluded from voting on the matter as a conflict of interest.227 This practice of preventing 
interested parties from voting is most likely to be observed in a meeting of a zoning board where 
it is acting in the capacity of a quasi-judicial body.228 However, when such a body acts in a 
legislative capacity, lawmakers with a bias frequently do not refrain from voting on such 
matters.229 The courts, though, are precluded from examining a legislator’s motives.230
The perception of fairness is a principal reason for requiring an impartial tribunal, as lack 
of such protection may lessen the trust in the adjudicative process.231  The Supreme Court has 
strongly endorsed this concept by virtue of its stringent rules for disqualification of judges.232
The Court concedes that the rule may sometimes exclude judges who have no actual bias but 
25
whose participation may create a perception of bias.233 One can distinguish between the 
standards of proving actual bias and the standards of the appearance of impartiality.234
There have been numerous documentations of abuse from this practice.235 For example, a 
councilman voted to approve a rezoning which resulted in his own property value being 
increased by $600,000.236 Because it was a legislative matter, however, this action was held not 
to be reviewable by a court.237 In a less egregious case, Maine’s highest court determined that 
procedural due process required vacating a decision made by commission board members who 
had not heard the evidence or assessed the credibility of witnesses.238
c) Notice and the Opportunity to be Heard
These two fundamental precepts of due process are applied in various manners, 
depending on the circumstances of the adjudicative bodies of local governments. Typically the 
board or commission will hold a public hearing following public notification.239 In some cases 
individuals with property or an interest directly affected by the proposed action receive direct 
personal notice of the meeting.240 Depending on the magnitude and impact  of the zoning change, 
additional hearings or workshops  may be held.241
Posner observed that due to the general nature of legislation, notice is impracticable, as 
many of the persons affected by the legislation will be unknown and unknowable.242 Many local 
governments are statutorily required to afford some level of notice and opportunity to be heard 
for decisions by legislative bodies, as exemplified by Florida’s “sunshine” law.243 In the area of 
zoning, some local governments require nearly the same notice and opportunity for legislative as 
for quasi-judicial decisions.244 Some courts are, however, lenient in enforcing notice and the 
opportunity to be heard and in allowing post-deprivation remedies when dealing with decisions 
by a legislative body.245
d) Ex Parte Communications
Precluding ex parte communications would entail major change from current practice in 
most local governments.246 Elected officials consider contact with constituents, including 
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developers, attorneys and landowners, as part of their jobs.247  Non-elected officials also 
frequently have meetings and discussions with potential parties to a zoning request.248 At the 
very least, due process would require that the officials (elected or appointed) divulge the content 
of the ex parte contacts at the hearing to enable interested parties to take account of them. The 
Idaho Supreme Court held that ex parte telephone calls to city council members prior to a 
hearing were outside the council’s record and violated due process.249  A Florida appellate court 
held that a quasi-judicial land use decision was invalid due to an ex parte communications with
elected officials250 In response to citizen frustration with the prohibition of meeting with elected 
officials, however, the legislature enacted a statute that specifically allowed voters access to their 
representatives.251
e) Record of Findings
A record is needed to allow the court to determine whether the local government 
followed the applicable rules of law and the procedures for fact-finding.252 Records not only 
help the court exercise control over the decision-making body, but they also make the deciding 
body more aware of its responsibilities and more likely to follow the procedures.253 Records of 
fact-finding can also improve the quality of judicial review. Commentators have been critical of 
the quality of the records kept.254
Florida Supreme Court Justice Pariente has criticized Snyder for not requiring a local 
government board to enter written findings of fact in meeting its burden of showing that the 
zoning achieves a legitimate purpose.255 She claimed that this omission may have 
unintentionally “lessened rather than heightened the review of the zoning decision.”256 In the 
same opinion, however, Justice Wells countered that the requirement for written findings in all 
quasi-judicial decision would be too cumbersome and could result in boilerplate writings and 
litigation over whether the writings are adequate.257 Other commentators have insisted that 
written findings are essential for effective review of quasi-judicial decisions. 258
3. Balancing the Efficiency of the Legislative Review Standard Against the Potential for Abuse
27
It is important question is effect of the standard of review (quasi-judicial or legislative) 
on the potential for abuse.  Abuses occur when decisions are made on the basis of political 
influence or favoritism, on the basis of inadequate procedure, or by uninformed government 
officials. Correcting abuses was one of the articulated factors driving the Snyder decision to 
establish quasi-judicial review in place of legislative review for certain land use transactions.259
There is a strong sense that quasi-judicial review will help prevent abuses because of  the 
due process afforded and the less deferential standard of review.260 Designating a process as 
quasi-judicial would in theory enhance the challenger’s opportunity to present the case before a
tribunal, for example by exclusion of ex parte communication and by clarifying evidence rules.
In a local government, however, often it is the same individuals making both legislative and 
quasi-judicial decision, but with different hats.261
A second significant difference between the quasi-judicial and legislative review 
processes is the degree of deference granted by the courts to the decision-making body. To 
overturn legislative decisions, the court must determine that the basis for the decision was 
capricious or arbitrary and not even debatable.262 For quasi-judicial decisions, the court still
defers to the judgment of the tribunal, but competent substantial evidence is required to preclude 
reversal.263  Because local boards  making zoning decision include elected officials and 
appointees who may be unduly swayed by a subsection of the electorate,  requiring that these 
decisions be based on competent substantial evidence may be the most effective control for 
small-scale amendments.264
These two features of legislative decisions as compared to quasi-judicial decisions (i.e., 
reduced due process and greater degree of deference) reinforce each other in limiting a citizen’s 
ability to challenge the decision.265  Accordingly, the courts and legislature should assure that 
there is a strong legal basis and a defensible rationale before providing that a decision be deemed 
legislative.
Although some authorities have claimed that due process rules are too cumbersome,266
preventing abuse may justify erring on the side of less deference and greater due process.267
There is little evidence that local governments that provide comparable due process for both 
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legislative and quasi-judicial zoning decision are overly burdened with the extra safeguards.268
On the other hand, because of the potential abuses of lawmaking bodies making decisions
without competent substantial evidence,269 there is a strong public policy argument for 
establishing competent substantial evidence as the standard of review for zoning decisions.  
B. Inequity and Lack of Consistency in Classifying
Small-Scale Amendments as Legislative Decisions
1. Small-Scale Amendments, Unlike Standard Amendments, Are N ot Policy Requiring the Fairly 
Debatable Standard 
The Coastal and Yusem decisions did not address the Snyder functional analysis test, 
which provided a logical basis for determining whether a decision is legislative or quasi-judicial 
(i.e.,  whether it formulates or applies policy). 270 Rather, in those decisions, the courts applied a 
purely mechanical rule for the standard of review for a comprehensive plan amendment with a
rationale that can be summarized as follows: 1) because it is an amendment, it is policy; 2) 
because it is policy, it is legislative; and 3) because it is legislative, it deserves deference (i.e., the 
fairly debatable standard of review).271
This rationale takes no account of the basic underlying principle for deferring to the
legislative based on historical practices or public policy.272 The policy/principle argument is as 
follows: 1) the legislature is broad-based, responding to a diverse constituency; 2) this diverse 
base gives it authority to make policy and makes it more difficult to provide due process or to 
address individual concerns; 3) the ultimate recourse of represented citizens is via the  ballot 
box; and 4) thus, legislative decisions deserve deference.273
These latter factors are not present for a small-scale amendment. The legislation is not 
broad-based, but rather is narrowly focused on a single parcel of land.274  Because it affects only 
a single parcel, relatively few other landowners are affected and only a small segment of the 
population will participate in the decision.  Because of the limited interest, the legislators are 
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unlikely to be voted out of office based on a small-scale amendment decision. Thus the decision 
does not merit the deferential fairly debatable standard. 275
The nature of the specific review processes for small-scale and standard amendments
supports the claim that the former is not policy.276 For example, processing a small-scale 
amendment in tandem with a rezoning indicates that the level of  community interest and the 
extent of debate  anticipated for a small-scale amendment are similar to those of a small scale 
rezoning, which is clearly not policy. 277  This process can be contrasted with that of standard 
(i.e., large-scale) amendments, which are permitted only twice a year in Florida.278 For these 
amendments, municipalities such as Jacksonville both anticipate and receive a much wider range 
of input and comment.279
In Coastal, the City of Jacksonville Beach argued that any small-scale amendment would 
require that the city council consider the policy impact of the amendment, including traffic, 
utilities, and other services.280 Yet the City’s brief before the Florida Supreme Court mentioned 
only that alternate vacant commercial space  was available nearby and that the proposed 
amendment would “violate the plan’s goal of encouraging the ‘infill’ of commercial 
development…”281  It is hard to see how granting this change for an area less than two acres 
could significantly affect the City’s overall growth plans. Moreover, the determination that the 
change in land use is not consistent with a policy of promoting infill of existing areas is arguably 
an application  of policy, not a formulation of policy. Given the significance of this holding, the 
court furnished no justification other than repeating that any change in the FLUM is a policy 
decision.282 There are undoubtedly numerous examples of changes to FLUMs for small parcels 
that likewise would have essentially no effect on policy. What is most troubling about the 
Coastal bright-line rule is its absolute nature that allows no specific determination whether 
policy is being formulated or applied.283
2. The Adoption Processes for Small-Scale Amendments and Rezonings are Similar, but their 
Classifications Differ
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The practices of several municipalities confirm that the procedures for adopting small-
scale amendment are very similar to those for small-scale rezoning.284 Yet, small-scale 
amendments are deemed legislative decisions while rezonings are quasi- judicial, resulting in an 
inherently inequitable judicial review process  One procedural difference is that the adopted 
small-scale amendment is submitted to the DCA for discretionary review, while a rezoning is 
not.285 Unless there is a specific challenge, however, the DCA will not review a small-scale 
amendment.286
The great similarity in review procedures is evidenced by the practice of processing a 
small-scale amendment and a rezoning in tandem.287  In a tandem process, a local government
seeking to change the use of a small parcel of land to a use not consistent with the FLUM pairs
the small-scale amendment ordinance with a rezoning ordinance for the identical parcel.288
For example, in the City of Jacksonville the process is as follows.289 Following a review 
and recommendation by staff, the paired ordinances are reviewed successively by the planning 
commission (the designated land planning agency), the Land Use and Zoning Committee (a 
subcommittee of the City Council) and the City Council.290 Although the ordinances are voted on 
separately, the testimony for and against are presented at the same hearings. 
The most significant substantive difference between these two actions is the type of 
review afforded a challenger.291 A property owner disagreeing with the rezoning files a writ of 
certiorari to a circuit court and force the municipality to bolster its denial with competent 
substantial evidence.292 An owner disputing the amendment files a de novo action for declaratory 
or injunctive relief; at the trial the local government must show only that the decision was not 
arbitrary or capricious. 293
A party opposing the approval of paired ordinances would be able to challenge the 
rezoning portion of the decision under a quasi-judicial process.294 But if the amendment were not 
paired to a rezoning, the chances of getting the decision reversed would be greatly diminished 
because of the fairly debatable standard applied to the amendment.295  On the other hand, 
consider a person challenging a denial of a paired amendment and zoning change. If the 
amendment were denied, the zoning board would not even vote on the proposed zoning as it 
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would be incompatible with the land use map.296 The challenger would thus be limited to a de 
novo court action with the burden to prove that the decision was not even fairly debatable.
3.   Classifying all Rezoning as Quasi-Judicial is Inconsistent with Snyder’s Functional Analysis
The Court’s bright-line rule in Yusem and Coastal that all amendments are legislative
implied that all land use changes not involving a change to the FLUM are  quasi-judicial.297
Because the courts did not indicate otherwise, this rule also applies to large scale rezonings that 
are consistent with the land use map.298 Allowing a rezoning of a large tract of land from (say) 
low density residential to commercial could, however, have a major impact on the need for new 
roads and utilities. Yet, under the strict rule it would be deemed quasi-judicial. Such a policy 
seems to be imprudent and inconsistent with Snyder’s functional analysis test .299
After articulating its major rule that "[g]enerally speaking, legislative action results in the 
formulation of a general rule of policy, whereas judicial action results in the application of a 
general rule of policy,"300 Judge Grimes added in an often overlooked comment: “[a]pplying this 
criterion, it is evident that comprehensive rezonings affecting a large portion of the public are 
legislative in nature.” 301  Under Yusem-Coastal, however, a large-scale rezoning that it not part 
of a plan amendment would not be subject to policy review or submitted to the DCA. 302 This 
procedure frustrates the legislators’ intent by depriving the DCA and other affected local 
governments and public agencies from potentially meaningful input.303
Yusem chose to distinguish rather than to overrule Snyder: “In Snyder II, we plainly did 
not deal with the issue of the appropriate standard of review for amendments to a comprehensive 
land use plan. 304 Judge Wells further e xplained the court’s position: 
While we continue to adhere to our analysis in Snyder with respect to the type of 
rezonings at issue in that case, we do not extend that analysis or endorse a 
functional, fact-intensive approach to determining whether amendments to local 
comprehensive land use plans are legislative decisions. Rather, we expressly 
conclude that amendments to comprehensive land use plans are legislative 
decisions.305
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Under an interpretation that Snyder classifies all rezonings that are policy as amendments, there 
would be no need to retain Snyder as it would be identical to the bright line rule.  Yet Yusem
implicitly affirms Snyder.306 The Coastal court’s comment on this distinction, “[h]owever, a 
proposed zoning change under Snyder must be consistent with the FLUM, thus requiring policy 
application instead of policy reformulation,” also implicitly affirms Snyder. 307
If Yusem and Coastal  did not overrule Snyder, as indicated, the Snyder functional 
analysis test is still valid for determining the standard of review for a rezoning not involving an 
amendment, i.e., “ comprehensive rezonings affecting a large portion of the public are legislative 
in nature.” 308   As a result, under Snyder, a small scale rezoning is typically quasi-judicial as it
affects only a small number of landowners and a small area, while a large-scale rezoning, 
affecting a large area and number of individual, is a legislative decision.309 This analysis is 
inconsistent with Coastal and Yusem, which imply that all rezoning are quasi-judicial.310
For amendments, on the other hand, the Snyder functional test is not valid according to 
these same decisions.311 Instead the Coastal and Yusem Courts have established a bright-line rule 
that all amendment are legislative. 312 The different approaches for classifying rezonings (Snyder 
functional test) and amendments (Yusem–Coastal bright-line rule) result in a significant 
inconsistency, which at the very least can cause confusion. Table 2 summarizes the apparent 
positions of the three Florida Supreme Court decisions on the four types of zoning actions.
Table 2. Classification of Zoning Decisions from Florida Supreme Court Opinions313
Type of Land Use Action Snyder    Yusem Coastal
Large Scale Amendment Legislative Legislative Legislative 
Small Scale Amendment Quasi-judicial Not addressed Legislative 
Large Scale Rezoning Legislative  Quasi-judicial Quasi-judicial
Small Scale Rezoning Quasi-judicial Quasi-judicial Quasi-judicial 
The procedures adopted by several municipalities confirm the confusion and 
inconsistency. Many, if not most of the municipalities in Florida treat all rezonings not involving 
an amendment as quasi-judicial.314 In Jacksonville, a recent rezoning ordinance unaccompanied 
by an amendment involved a tract with an area greater than 800 acres.315 This rezoning and 
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similar rezonings were decided upon without providing copies to the Florida DCA, DOT or DEP 
to review.316 In addition, although affected parties aware of the zoning action may seek 
appropriate judicial review, many parties, including the public and public agencies, could be 
seriously affected by this government action, yet not have an opportunity for meaningful review.
4. The Yusem-Coastal Bright-Line Rule Is Not Consistent with the Statutory Differences
Between Small-Scale and Standard Amendments 
The Yusem–Coastal bright line rule defines all amendments as legislative, subject to the 
fairly debatable standard of review.317 The basic rationale is that these are all formulations of 
policy subject to the extensive multi-agency state-wide review process.318 However, because a 
small-scale amendment differs substantially from a standard amendment in its nature and in the 
approval process, requiring the same classification for all amendments is not appropriate.
 A zoning change of ten acres or less that amends only the FLUM, but does not alter the 
text of the comprehensive plan, qualifies as a small-scale amendment.319 The legislature does not 
require DCA to review such an amendment because it typically involves only a single parcel, it 
affects only a small number of interests, and it does not involve a new policy. Similarly, because 
it has not undergone substantive, if any, policy review at the local government level, the standard 
of review should be quasi-judicial.320 It is instructive to compare the type of review at the local 
government for a small scale amendment with the semi-annual comprehensive plan amendments. 
For the latter, there is substantially more discussion and debate addressing real policy issues such 
as the amendment’s impact on traffic, schools, and utilities.321
 It is noteworthy that the 1995 amendments to the Florida statutes that streamlined the 
state review for a small-scale amendment were enacted following Snyder (1993) but prior to 
Yusem (1997).322 Thus, the legislators were aware of the Snyder functional analysis test under 
which a small-scale amendment would be subject to quasi-judicial review if it were an 
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application of policy rather than a formulation of policy.323 The legislature’s elimination of a 
major portion of the review process of a small-scale amendment is consistent with a recognition 
that such an amendment does not involve formulation of policy based on the Snyder functional 
analysis test.324 Yusem and Coastal established a protocol that is intrinsically different from the 
one in Snyder for determining the standard of review for zoning changes.325 The difference 
hinges on whether it involves an amendment.  Under Yusem and Coastal, if the change involves 
an amendment, the decision is always legislative. 326 Under Snyder, if the change involves 
another zoning action, the decision is based on the functional analysis test.327 Thus, under 
Snyder, a rezoning not involving an amendment may be legislative or quasi-judicial depending 
on the number of individuals affected.328
 In response to an amicus curiae brief, the City of Jacksonville Beach noted that although 
the review processes for small-scale and standard amendments differ, this difference “does not 
transform what is a quintessential legislative act into one which is quasi-judicial.” 329 The City 
also noted that the procedure still allows the state to intervene during the adoption phase to 
ensure that the amendment complies with the statute.330  This response did not, however, suggest 
how the DCA would be alerted to the need to intervene without having previously reviewed the 
amendment. It also does not address the reduced capability of challenging the amendment.
V. CONCLUSIONS 
This article re-examines the holding in Coastal that a small-scale amendment is a 
legislative decision subject to the fairly debatable judicial standard of review. The author 
maintains that the Yusem-Coastal bright-line rule fails to properly account for inequities and 
inconsistencies in the law. As a result, the Court has not eliminated confusion or established a 
consistent, rational means for classifying land use decisions.
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A. Small- Scale Amendments Are Not Policy
Small-scale amendment should not be classed as legislative decisions because the 
traditional separation of powers argument breaks down at the local level and because the 
decisions do not formulate policy.  On a federal or state level, the legislature’s broad base and 
diversity of input justify giving great deference to legislative decisions. This diversity of input, 
which allows coalitions to offset one another to prevent dominance, is simply not present for a 
local government. As a result, there is greater opportunity for undue influence by powerful 
developers and others, with a far greater likelihood of abuse in land use decisions. 
Not only does the legislature not operate under the federal model envisioned by the 
framers, but there is often no true separation of powers at the local level. In many instances, 
council or commission members serve on both legislative and quasi-judicial bodies. This 
arrangement does not justify separate judicial review processes depending on which hat the 
individuals were wearing at the time of the decision. 
Defining a small-scale amendment  as policy does not make it legislative and deserving 
of deference. What gives legislature its legitimacy is the process of legislation. When this 
process loses its broad-based character and its distinction from an adjudicative body, as typically 
occurs for local councils or commissions, the rationale for deference is also lost. The Snyder
court and numerous commentators have furnished ample documentation of abuses by biased 
decision-makers.331
The evidence also clearly indicates that a small-scale amendment, as defined by the 
Florida law, is not necessarily a true policy decision. A change in the FLUM for a small parcel of 
land will often have a non-negligible impact only on those landowners in the immediate vicinity. 
It seems unlikely that the local board or council will thoroughly examine the impact on a broad
range of policy issues of each amendment as suggested in the Yusem and Coastal opinions, 
particularly with strong commercial interests at stake.332
The state and local procedures support this interpretation. The Florida statutory procedure 
does not require routine review of small-scale amendments by DCA or other public agencies.333
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At the local level, several municipalities provide essentially the same review procedures for a 
small-scale amendment and for a rezoning.334  The inference is that the type of review conducted 
at the local level depends on the extent of impact, thereby resembling the Snyder functional 
analysis test.  Accordingly, there is no basis for a different classification and standard of review 
for small-scale amendment and small scale rezonings.
B. Land Use Action Classifications are Inconsistent and Conflicting
 The statutes and case law provide an inconsistent framework for classifying land use 
decisions by local  governments. Because Yusem and Coastal explicitly stated that they were not 
overruling Snyder regarding land use decisions not involving a plan amendment, the latter 
court’s functional analysis test is still valid for rezonings. This test would conceivably classify 
the  rezoning of a large and strategically placed parcel of land as a formulation of policy, 
requiring a legislative review process. However, according to the Yusem-Coastal bright-line test, 
only amendments are legislative, with all other rezonings classified as quasi-judicial.335 Thus, for 
a large scale rezoning, the Snyder functional analysis test results in a different classification than 
the Yusem-Coastal bright line rule. In essence, the court is deferring to the local government to 
implement Snyder. Local zoning codes, however, typically do not distinguish between small-
scale and standard rezonings. A standard rezoning, affecting a larger number of constituents,
though generating substantial discussion of policy, will not be designated as a legislative 
decision.336
The Coastal -Yusem rule that provides the same standard of review for all comprehensive 
plan amendments is not consistent with the state statutes.  The 1995 amendment to the Growth 
Management Act established significant changes in the procedures for reviewing a small-scale 
amendment, suggesting that the legislature considered these actions substantively different from 
standard plan amendments.337 The principal difference is that there is no external independent 
body (i.e., DCA or other agency) reviewing the small-scale amendment for consistency with 
state statutes, regional plans or state-wide plans or verifying the internal consistency of the 
amended plan.338 This situation differs significantly from the multi-stage review described by 
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Coastal in justifying the classification of the small-scale amendment.339 The fact that the 
legislative amendments were enacted following Snyder, but prior to Yusem or Coastal, support
the claim that they are more consistent with Snyder.
C.  Lack of Procedural Due Process Is a Concern for Local Land Use Decisions
Deference to local boards is based on a misplaced faith that the legislative process 
protects public and private interests against unfair or biased decisions. The inherent reduction of 
due process for a legislative decision compared to a quasi-judicial one may significantly affect 
challengers’ rights at the local level. Although notice and an opportunity to be heard, the most 
important facets of procedural due process, are widely available in local decisions, local bodies 
do not adequately address ex parte communication or the need for unbiased decision making. 
Where elected officials also serve in a quasi-judicial capacity, the nature of local governments 
may make enforcing ex parte rules impractical. Establishing independent commissions for the 
quasi-judicial decision may be especially burdensome on very small counties or cities and is 
likely to generate resistance.340
Although local governments are not likely to require formal due process even for quasi-
judicial hearings, they must at least assure a process that prevents blatant abuse of ex parte
communication and bias by lawmakers. Examples of mitigating factors are requiring records of 
certain ex parte communications, strict ethics codes for decision-makers, and vigilant press 
coverage.
Commentators and judges have weighed in both for and against requiring record-keeping 
of fact finding. In an era where the need for transparency and accountability in government are 
universally agreed upon, the arguments for requiring records seem persuasive. The ease and 
convenience of acquiring and retaining electronic records support this conclusion.
 Local governments should be aware that although due process is not formally required 
for a legislative decision, the procedures afforded the aggrieved landowner may be the only 
realistic opportunity to win the case, given the limited opportunity for judicial review. Thus, 
independent of the implications for judicial review, due process is essential to assure that the 
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decision is a fair one arrived at in a recognized fair and reasonable manner. The effort to resolve 
these problem will be offset by the potential reduction or elimination of “the confusion, 
corruption and abuse of individual rights which is inherent…” in the legislative process.341
D. The Court’s Reasons for the Fairly Debatable Standard Are Not Convincing
The reasons offered by the Coastal-Yusem court do not support imposing the fairly 
debatable standard on an aggrieved landowner seeking to challenge a local government’s 
decision.  Coastal maintained that in spite of the lack of mandatory review by the DCA, the 
existence of other remedies available to affected parties constituted sufficient safeguards.342
Unfortunately, these remedies do not provide the affected person with the right to challenge
based on the competent substantial evidence standard.
Coastal’s other claimed benefit of the holding was that the bright-line rule offered 
uniformity and certainty in land use decisions.343 One counter is that because of the 
inconsistencies of Coastal with the statutes and with Snyder in classifying a large scale rezoning, 
the courts may be faced with additional challenges on the validity of these laws. Moreover, 
certainty in the judicial outcome is not always a virtue if the decision results in inequities or in 
inadequate legal remedies for grievances. 
E. Recommendations for Legislative Reform
Although the intent of this article is not to develop a detailed proposal for modifying the 
procedures for reviewing small-scale amendments, guidelines are presented below for legislative 
reform of the process.
1. Eliminate the Distinction Between Legislative and Quasi-Judicial Review for Zoning Actions.
 The review of all zoning actions should be based on a standard of competent substantial 
evidence or equivalent. There is no reason the government should not be required to provide this 
39
level of specificity to establish its case. One proposed mechanism is the “rational justification 
rule” suggested by Siemon and Kendig.344
2. Eliminate the Two Levels of Review for Small-Scale and Standard Plan Amendments
 State statutory review should be limited to zoning changes that have a significant impact 
on policy or that affect a large number of interested parties.345 To achieve this, it is recommended 
that the legislature establish criteria for types of zoning change requiring review by DCA and 
other public and government agencies such as the following:
o Comprehensive plan amendments greater than ten acres, along with  other criteria 
under the current statutes;
o Zoning changes of greater than some minimum tract size (e.g., fifty acres); and
o Other tracts based on special circumstances such as: requests by the local government 
based on guidelines; or requests by interested parties based on recognized criteria and 
possibly requiring authorization from a magistrate.
3. Establish Minimal Due Process Requirements.
State statutes are needed to ensure minimal criteria for impartial tribunal (based on strict 
conflict of interest limitations and disclosure of communication), record of findings for all 
adjudicatory or advisory local government bodies, and modified restriction on ex parte 
communication, Although it is not practical to limit ex parte entirely, strict guidelines are needed
requiring advance notification where possible and strict reporting of contacts. In addition, 
although most local governments provide adequate notice and opportunity to be heard and to 
present evidence, the legislature should codify these by statute.
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